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THE REVIEW OF STANDARDIZED
TESTING CASES:
THE QUEST FOR A STANDARD
The confusion surrounding the use and validity of standardized tests
as employment qualification criteria, particularly their effect on racial
minorities,' has left courts in a state of uncertainty.2 A recent decision
signifies a reconciliation of the disparate standards of review applied by
previous courts. In the consolidated cases of Walston v. County School
Board and United States v. Nansemond County School Board,3 a group
of black teachers formerly employed by defendant school systems alleged
that the respective school board had violated their fourteenth
amendment rights by requiring the teachers to take, and achieve a
certain score on, the National Teacher Examination (NTE).4 This
qualification and selection plan resulted in a substantial reduction in
the county's black teaching staff.5
The district court upheld the school board's utilization of the NTE as
a hiring criterion, finding a "reasonably necessary connection between
1. See Cooper& Sobol, Seniority and Testing UnderFair Employment Laws:A General
Approach to Objective Criteria for Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1598, 1638-42
(1969); Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1123 (1971); Comment, Equal Protection and
Standardized Testing, 44 Miss. L.J. 900, 901, 905 (1973). See generally Bonfield, The
Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation I: Employers, 61 Nw. U.L.
REv. 907 (1967); Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in
Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 691 (1968); Comment, Validity of
Standardized Employment Testing Under Title VII and The Equal Protection Clause, 37
Mo. L. REv. 693 (1972).
2. Compare Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 340 F. Supp. 1351
(1972), modified, 360 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1973), with Baker v. Columbus Municipal
Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Comment, Equal Protection
and Standardized Testing, supra note 1, at 904, 906.
3. 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974).
4. The school board adopted the requirement in January, 1970. Those teachers
completing their first year of teaching in the school district and all new applicants were
required to achieve a minimum score of 500 on the weighted common section of the
examination. Teachers in such nonacademic areas as physical and driver education were
exempted. Id. at 921.
5. Prior to the inauguration of the NTE, the school district's faculty was 59% black. After
the implementation of the exam, the percentage dropped to 52% by 1972. At the end of the
1970-71 school year, 21 of the 25 teachers who were not offered new contracts were black.
Fifteen of these black teachers were terminated solely on the basis of their NTE scores. Id. at
922.
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the qualities tested . . and the actual requirements of the job to be
performed." 6 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court decision, declaring the NTE invalid for failing to bear a
demonstrable relationship to successful teacher performance. 7 Since no
study had been made to show any correlation between the NTE score and
the "ultimately effective in-service teacher," the court found the use of a
cut-off score to be patently arbitrary and discriminatory. 8
While most courts are in general accord with Walston in holding that
utilization of standardized tests as qualification criteria for employment
are often arbitrary and discriminatory, 9 they have deviated radically in
choosing the applicable standard of review.'0 By examining the
confusing and dissimilar standards of review applied by previous courts
6. 351 F. Supp. 196, 203, 205 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd, 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974).
Recognizing the dilemma faced by the school board, the district court stated:
This case is interesting and deserves close attention in that it clearly defines the
paradox which is currently facing the school boards and district courts .... On the
one hand, the school board is admonished for using subjective standards in
evaluating its teachers and is told that only objective standards are acceptable.
Conversely, once the school board adopts a criteria which could hardly be more
objective, protests are lodged because employment decisions are made without
reference to some purely subjective standards. If wewere required to invalidate both
guidelines, the school board would find itself forced to adopt a quota system,
disregarding the qualifications of the teachers involved. Such a result is the
antithesis of the philosophy underlying much civil rights litigation.
Id. at 200.
7. 492 F.2d at 924-25.
8. Id. at 925.
9. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't
of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975); Davisv. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C.
Cir.), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504
F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v.
Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991
(1975); Moody v. Alberrnarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 405
(1975); Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972);
Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972);
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chancev. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167
(1972), modified sub. nom. Chance v. Board of Educ., 496 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1974); Carterv.
Gallagher, 452 F.2d315 (8th Cir. 1971),cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Western Addition
Community Organization v. Alioto, 340 F. Supp. 1351 (1972), modified, 360 F. Supp. 733
(N.D. Cal. 1973); Arrington v. Massachusetts BayTransp. Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D.
Mass. 1969). But see Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975); Allen v. City of Mobile,
466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972); Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394 (D.
Md. 1974).
10. There is consensus on only one point. In all testing cases courts will shift the burden
of proof to defendants after plantiffs' statistical data indicates that the use of a particular
requirement resulted in the elimination of a disproportionate numberof blacks. See Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
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in fourteenth amendment challenges to standardized tests, one perceives
how testing law under the fourteenth amendment," and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 has come to be so inextricably interwoven.
Walston demonstrates that the review of a standardized testing
requirement under the fourteenth amendment today necessarily entails
a complementary analysis of Title VII.
Discrimination in public employment has been prohibited since the
ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868.13 It was not until the
adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),14 however, that
discrimination in private employment was proscribed. Title VII of the
Act originally prohibited discrimination against employees because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin by any employer with twenty-
five or more employees engaged in interstate commerce.15 By its own
terms Title VII afforded protection only to private employees, excluding
public school teachers and other public employees from the scope of its
coverage. 16 Until 1972, federal courts confronted with cases involving
Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.. 520 F.2d420(2dCir. 1975); Davis
v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976); Boston Chapter,
NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975);
Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v.
Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991
(1975); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 405
(1975); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973);
Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972);
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (1972), modified sub. nom., Chance v. Board
of Educ., 496 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1974); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364
F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Western Addition
Community Organization v. Alioto, 340 F. Supp. 1351 (1972), modified, 360 F. Supp. 733
(N.D. Cal. 1973).
11. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. II, 1972).
13. The fourteenth amendment is directed to the states:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. II, 1972).
15. Id. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a), as amended, (3upp. II, 1972) (now applies to employers
with fifteen or more employees).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l, as amended, (Supp. II, 1972) (amendment removed exemption
for non-religious (public) educational institutions).
1976]
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equal protection challenges to various testing qualification plans
imposed on public employees were confined in their standards of review
to the two traditional equal protection standards-rational relationship
or strict scrutiny.17
Administrative deficiencies in the statutory program led Congress to
reconsider its effectiveness, resulting in the enactment of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA) 8 (amending Title VII).
EEOA widened the definition of "employer" to include states and their
political subdivisions, and removed the exemption previously enjoyed
by educational institutions. 19 Additionally, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)20 promulgated guidelines2 ' to insure
fair employment practices in hiring.2 2 A significant feature of the
regulations is the method provided to measure test validity. The
17. The most lenient equal protection standard is the rational relationship test which
requires that a classification bear a "rational relationship" to the object of the legislation.
A statute will be reasonable if it is designed to effectuate some legitimate state interest. See
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949); Kotch v. Board of
River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552,556 (1947); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S.
150, 155 (1897). A more exacting equal protection standard is employed if a statute
infringes on a recognized "fundamental right" or embodies a "suspect classification."
This standard mandates rigorous judicial scrutiny. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Under the strict scrutiny
standard the state must demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify the suspect
classification without which it is reduced to an invidious discrimination forbidden by the
equal protection clause. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964). The strict scrutiny standard of review recently has been extended
beyond statutes that are discriminatory on their faces to apparently neutral statutes that
have been arbitrarily administered. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966), the strict scrutiny standard was applied to a statute which, though neutral on its
face, had a discriminatory impact on members of a minority race. See also Gaston County
v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist.,
462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972).
18.42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to2000e-17 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§2000e to2000e-
15(1970).
19. The EEOA also reduced to 15 the number of employees a person must have in order
to qualify as an "employer" under the Act. Id. § 2000e(b), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1970).
20. The EEOC was created by Congress to administer the 1964 Act and to regulate the use
of standardized tests for employment qualification. Id. § 2000e-4 (Supp. II, 1972).
21. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1975).
22. The EEOC advocated employment testing procedures which emphasize these
elements:
1. Careful job analysis to define the skill requirements related to the performance of the
specific job.
2. Special efforts in recruiting minorities.
[Vol. 11:343
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employer must be able to show evidence of test validity by proving a
satisfactory correlation between performance on the standardized test
and job performance.23
Thus, a public school teacher who prior to 1972 had only a cause of
action under the fourteenth amendment could now bring suit under
Title VII. Even before the enactment of the EEOA, however, courts
referred to Title VII to determine the appropriate standard of review
under the equal protection clause.2 4 Consequently, judicial review of
3. Screening and interviewing related to job requirements.
4. Tests selected on the basis of specific job-related criteria.
5. Comparison of test performance to job performance.
6. Opportunity for retesting of those who failed the tests but then acquired more
training or experience.
7. Validation of tests for norms that include representative minority group members.
Comment, Validity of Standardized Employment Testing, supra note 1, at 696-97. The
current regulations have expanded the above guidelines. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1975).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1975). The two most common categories of test validation are
content and predictive validity. A test has content validity if the test items reflect an
accurate sample of the qualities sought to be measured by the test. The burden of proof is
on the employer to conclusively demonstrate that the knowledge and skills necessary for
the job bear a relation to the questions on the examination. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1975).
Content validity alone will be acceptable only in the case of well-developed tests. Such tests
consist of suitable samples of the essential knowledge, skills or behavior which compose
the job in question. For example, a test for typists that requires the applicant to perform
some typing would be content valid. See generally W. MEHRENS & J. LEHMAN,
STANDARDIZED TEsrs IN EDUCATION 43 (1969).
Predictive validity involves testing a large representative sample of applicants,
permitting all the test takers to perform the job in question and then correlating test
performance with job performance. A test is valid to the extent that those who perform well
on the test tend to perform better on the job. Predictive validity is particularly unreliable,
however, when tests are administered to mixed racial groups. A basic assumption
underlying prediction from test scores is the "equal exposure" assumption. A test
measures how well a person has learned various skills and retained information. To the
extent an entire group tested has had equal opportunity to learn these skills and
information, test scores might be expected to bear some relationship to how well persons
in the group can perform the job. But in the case of a comparison of blacks and whites, the
"equal exposure" assumption is undercut. The general pattern of racial discrimination,
lesser educational and cultural opportunities for black people, and cultural separatism,
have impeded blacks in attaining the background necessary for success on existing
standardized tests. A consequence of this discrimination and segregation is the lower
average score for blacks on most standardized tests, verbal as well as nonverbal. See Cooper
& Sobol, supra note 1, at 1639-49, 1656-69. When a test has an adverse effect on blacks, a
more direct showing of the relevance of the test to job performance is required. 29 C.F.R. §
1607.5(bX5) (1975). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1123;
Comment, Equal Protection and Standardized Testing, supra note 1, at 904-08.
24. For a comparison of the standard of review under Title VII with the fourteenth
amendment standards see Developments in the Law, supra note 1; Comment, Validity of
Standardized Employment Testing, supra note 1.
1976]
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employment tests under the fourteenth amendment and Title VII
overlapped. This development was prompted by the Supreme Court's
sole decision in the confused testing field. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2 5
the Supreme Court, establishing the framework of the law on job testing
under Title VII, held that: (1) tests must demonstrate a reasonable
measure of job performance; (2) discriminatory intent need not be
apparent on the face of the employment criteria; and (3) once an uneven
racial impact has been shown, the employer bears the burden of proving
the job relatedness of the test.2 6 The Court emphasized the "job
relatedness" standard as the proper criterion for review of standardized
testing cases.27
At first courts were hesitant to extend their review beyond the lenient
rational relationship test of the fourteenth amendment.2 8 In Western
Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 9 however, in addition to
establishing a"reasonably necessary" relationship between the qualities
tested and the requirements of the job, the district court went one step
beyond the traditional analysis by examining the different methods of
test validation. 30
Subsequent to Alioto courts became willing to temper their equal
protection determinations with consideration of Title VII criteria. In
Chance v. Board of Examiners3' the district court concluded that the
rational relationship standard was inappropriate because the case
25. 401 U.S. 424 -(.197 1). In Griggs blue collar workers in defendani's power plant were
required to take a general intelligence test. The test was invalidated because the employer
had not made the necessary job analysis to prove a reasonable relationship between test
scores and job performance. Id. at 433-36.
26. Id. at 432-36.
27. See Note; Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 72
COLUM. L. REv. 900 (1972).
28. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub. noma. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
29. 340 F. Supp. 1351, 1352, 1354-55 (1972) (civil service test required for firemen),
modified, 360 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
30. The test was invalidated in this case because the employer had not made a job
analysis required to prove a relationship between the test and performance on the job. Id.
at 1355-56; see note 25 supra. Impetus for the application of the EEOC guidelines under
Title VII to clarify an appropriate standard of review under the equal protection clause
appears to have come from the Supreme Court's Title VII decision in Griggs. See 22
BUFFALO L. REv. 655, 659 (1973).
31. 458 F.2d 1167 (1972), modified sub. nom. Chance v. Board of Educ., 496 F.2d 820 (2d
Cir. 1974). Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of exams administered by the Board
of Examiners for permanent employment in supervisory positions.
[Vol. 11:343
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involved racial discrimination. The Second Circuit affirmed but refused
to apply the strict scrutiny standard as prescribed by the lower court.3 2
Instead, the court suggested that challenges brought under the
fourteenth amendment should be subject to the same standard of review
as Title VII challenges.3 3 Shortly thereafter, in Castro v. Beecher,34 the
First Circuit found the district court's application of the rational
relationship test to be inadequate in cases in which there was a racial
impact.35 Although the court refrained from a rigorous application of
strict scrutiny, the standard employed was similar to strict scrutiny, since
it related "the substantial congruence of employment requirements to
job performance. ' 3 6 Rather than rely on strict scrutiny, the Castro court
chose to clothe its decision in Title VII terms, thus equating the
protection afforded by Title VII with that of the fourteenth amend-
ment.3 7 Finally, the Fifth Circuit, forced to reach the issue of
employment discrimination 8 in Baker v. Columbus Municipal
Separate School District,39 determined that the Graduate Record
Examination was actually used for the purpose and with the effect of
racial discrimination. Using the strict scrutiny standard, the court
required a compelling state interest to justify the test.40
32. Id. at 1174-78.
33. Id. at 1177. Chance is notable for going further than any previous court in requiring
high standard for validation. The Board of Examiners had formulated its test for the
specific job, utilizing expert advice, and produced expert testimony in court. Yet the court
found that the test resulted in such substantial inequalities that it was forced to invalidate
it.
34. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
35. The court explained that the lenient rational relationship test was adequate only if
there was no racial impact. Id. at 732.
36. Id. at 733.
37. Holding the Griggs rule controlling, the court declared, "We cannot conceive that
the words of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it has been applied in racial [employment
discrimination] cases, demand anything less." Id.
38. The Fifth Circuit was reluctant at first even to reach the issue of employment
discrimination. The court skirted the racial discrimination issue inArmsteadv. Starkville
Municipal School Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972). In Armstead the courtagreed that the
arbitrary use of the Graduate Record Examination was impermissible in teacher selection
but withheld judgment on whether the use of this examination created a suspect racial
classification. For an analysis of Armstead see 22 BUFFALo L. REv. 655 (1973).
39. 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972).
40. The court cited Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), stating that
"[w]henever the effect of a law or policy produces such a racial distortion it is subject to
strict scrutiny." 462 F.2d at 1114. Distinguishing Korematsu as a case involving
1976]
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In an attempt to devise a standard of review for fourteenth amendment
testing cases, Walston reaffirms the Baker court's use of strict scrutiny
and the Castro court's application of the Griggs rule.4' In this way the
Fourth Circuit synthesized the limited precedent, 42 equating equal
protection allegations with Title VII challenges. Previous courts had
skirted the discrimination issue by invalidating the tests on the basis of
their arbitrary administrationg The Walston court, instead, avoided the
arbitrary administration issue,44 and focused on the legality of the
standardized test itself. By equating an equal protection claim with a
challenge brought under Title VII, the Fourth Circuit found that the
district court had applied too lenient a test. Instead of merely bearing a
rational relationship to job performance, the court borrowed the more
stringent Griggs standard that a test must "bear a demonstrable
relationship to successful performance on the job for which [the test is]
used. '45 Because the NTE produced racial distortion, the court reasoned
"intentional" discrimination rather than "incidental" or "unintentional" discrimina-
tion, the Baker court then noted. "Even though this policy [in Baker] does not on its face
purport to classify along racial lines as in Korematsu ... its effects can be just as
devastating." Id. at 1114 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973), in which the court held that the same issues were
involved in litigation under both the fourteenth amendment and Title VII and thus
applied the Griggs rationale.
41. 492 F.2d at 924-25.
42. The blanket grouping of employees for testing in a single examination had been
condemned by the Fourth Circuit in an earlierTitle VII case. In Moody v. Albemarle Paper
Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the court set out principles
under which the use of a standardized testfor employment selection could be measured. Id.
at 138 n.2.
43. See note 38 supra.
44. It is quite possible that the court could have invalidated the school board's selection
plan solely on the basis of its arbitrary administration. Although in theory the test was
only required of first year teachers and new applicants, the board nevertheless compelled
several experienced teachers, some with more than 10 years of teaching service, to take the
test. The fact that they were transfer teachers (experienced teachers from other school
districts) or absent on maternity leave extinguished their seniority. The exemptions to the
test were not administered uniformly in the nonacademic areas. A teacher instructing
physical education classes, an exempt category, was compelled to take the test on the
presumption she might also teach health, a nonexempt area. Other teachers who were not
required to take the test had never completed a teacher training program or earned a
college degree. These teachers were reemployed solely on the basis of their principals'
evaluations. Brief for Appellants at 16-18, Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th
Cir. 1974) (on file with Urban Law Annual).
45. 492 F.2d at 924, quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 402 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
[Vol. 11:343
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that it should be subject to stricter scrutiny.46
The school board supported the use of the standardized test as a means
of assuring "that... teachers coming into Nansemond County should
at least bring a minimal amount of general knowledge into the
classroom." 47 Thus, they adopted a cut-off score of 500 to accomplish
this goal. The Fourth Circuit, while acknowledging a school board's
right to "improve the caliberof its faculty," mandated that the "policies
and procedures employed must be clearly and fairly related to this
goal." 48 The court adopted this standard from the Baker rationale that
"[iun order to withstand an equal protection attack [the NTE] must be
justified by an overriding purpose independent of its racial effects. '49
Satisfied with this more rigorous standard, the court then attacked the
lower court's approval of content validation.50 The Fourth Circuit
emphasized the inadequacies inherent in the use of broad and general
testing devices in teacher selection.51 When such tests are used to
determine which of several teachers will perform best on the job, the
court determined that predictive validity 2 was certainly the proper area
of judicial scrutiny. The court's analysis comes as a surprise,
particularly after the lower court's finding that predictive validity would
46. Id. at 925. In 1970-71, 127 in-service teachers were required to take the NTE: 21 were
black and 106 white. Seventy percent of the blacks failed, compared to two percent of the
whites. Id. at 922; see note 5 supra.
47. 492 F.2d at 925.
48. Id.
49. Id., quotingBakerv. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112,1114
(5th Cir. 1972).
50. Because the school board had failed to make a validation study demonstrating that
the knowledge necessary for the teaching positions bore any relation to the questions on
the examination, the Fourth Circuit could find no justification for the lower court's
determination. Id. at 924-26; see note 23 supra.
51. 492 F.2d at 926. The court perceived that evaluating teacher ability involves a great
number of unknown variables. To validate a standardized examination which ostensibly
tested "ability" would be a difficult task. The court realized how difficult it was to agree on
what constitutes "teaching ability" itself, much less its determinants. Id.
Tests have no way of measuring classroom activity, personality, teacher-student
rapport, and enthusiasm. "[B]ecause any independent determination of teaching" ability
employed to establish the validity of a particular test instrument would be qualitative at
best, it would be virtually impossible to establish a score on any standardized examination
below which a person could be considered incompetent to teach. Teaching is quite simply
more of an art than a quantifiable skill." 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 655, 669 (1973).
52. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
19761
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be impossible to achieve.53 Walston, in essence, holds that if present
technology is not sophisticated enough to design a test with a marked
capability of predicting teacher performance, school boards will have to
resort to alternative criteria for selecting teachers.54
The Walston court makes clear the applicability of Title VII
guidelines to employment discrimination challenges in the teaching
profession. The court's additional acknowledgement of the Baker
court's strict scrutiny standard is relevant in reconciling the law under
equal protection and Title VII. The court equates the standard of
compelling state interest and demonstrable relationship and affords
similar treatment to all challenges to standardized tests, whether they are
brought under Title VII or the fourteenth amendment. This equivalence
might have removed some of the uncertainty confronting courts. By
disregarding the traditional equal protection tests and focusing instead
on the Title VII guidelines (job-relatedness and predictive validity),
53. The Fourth Circuit was unmindful of the lower court's plea:
The evidence clearly establishes that no study has shown any correlation between
any score and the ultimately effective in-service teacher, that is, teacher ability to
increase learning capacity of students. Thus the NTE lacks predictive validity.
However, the evidence also reveals that no test currently measures this relationship;
nor is it likely that any test could be developed to accomplish this goal. ... It seems
ridiculous to say that before a test is a reasonable measure it must also do the
impossible.
351 F. Supp. at 203-04; see note 51 supra. Impetus for the court's approach also appears to
be derived from a prospectus issued by the originators of the NTE which states:
"The National Teacher Examinations are designed to provide objective standar-
dized measures of theacademic achievement of college seniors completing four-year
programs of teacher education.... [T]he [National Teacher Examinations]...
are not intended as a measure of classroom performance; those desiring to test
teachers in service will not find the National Teacher Examinations a substitute for
direct observation of their on-the-job accomplishments."
492 F.2d at 924-25 n.4. The court also quoted from the Guidelines for Using the National
Teacher Examination which stated that "test scores contribute little or nothing to the
evaluation of an in-service teacher." Id. at 925 n.4
54. The issue that courts seem so reluctant to reach is a determination of precisely what
test instruments, if any, will be permissible. Walston, while condemning the use of the
general section of the NTE, suggests that "subject area testing" may be acceptable if
properly and fairly administered. 492 F.2d at 926. Previously, the Baker court in a footnote
cited the appendices to its decision in United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 459 F.2d 600
(5th Cir. 1972), as examples of "objective, nonracial, and reasonable" criteria. 462 F.2d at
1115 n.4. Commentators, however, have criticized the latter criteria for failing toprovidea
single means of evaluating a teacher's classroom performance. See 22 BUFFALO L. REv.
655, 674 (1973). In Armstead v. Starkville Municipal School Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.
1972), the Fifth Circuit approved the requirement of a masters degree as an objective
qualification criterion for teacher selection. See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol, supra note 1, at
1666-69; Note, Employment Testing supra note 27, at 920-24.
[Vol. 11:343
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol11/iss1/16
THE REVIEW OF STANDARDIZED TESTING CASES
courts would have a much more concrete standard upon which to render
judgments. The Walston decision, however, comes too late. Because the
EEOA of 1972 expanded the coverage of Title VII, aggrieved public
school teachers will most likely bring future suits under both Title VII
and the fourteenth amendment. With the EEOC Guidelines and
validation studies to rely on, courts will no longer be confronted with
the added task of attempting to fit fourteenth amendment challenges
into the framework of Title VII.
The semblance of order that Walston brought to the review of
standardized testing, however, may still be of consequence. Walston still
can be significant for narrowing the school board's discretionary power
to select "qualified" faculty members. The Baker court stressed the
importance of maintaining the school board's discretion in the teacher
selection process.55 Walston is more concerned with granting employees
their rights to an equal employment opportunity. 5 Any discretionary
power harbored by the school board is only secondary. The use of a
general standardized test, when coupled with an arbitrary cut-off score,
certainly defeats the right to an equal employment opportunity. The
school board must bear the burden of showing that the use of a
standardized test is within its discretionary power and only through
Title VII validation studies can such a burden be met.5 7 Whether this
school board or any school board will be successful in meeting this
burden is at best speculative.
Finally, Walston may signify the demise of the standardized test as
qualification criteria for teacher employment. The inherent error of a
standardized test is that it fails to test important determinants of
teaching competence such as classroom activity, personality, teacher-
student rapport, and enthusiasm. Taking into account the negligible
validity of the generally available standardized test used to evaluate
teachers, it is not surprising that the Walston court declared the NTE
cut-off score of 500 to be patently arbitrary and discriminatory. Unless
testing techniques can be sufficiently refined to meet minimum Title
VII validation standards, courts following the Fourth Circuit's lead will
force school boards to look with ever-increasing favor upon academic
55. 462 F.2d 1112, 1115 (5th Cir. 1972).
56. "[Tlhe principle of equal employment opportunity is the law of the land. and it
must never be dishonored." 492 F.2d at 927.
57. See generally Brief for Appellants at 36-43, Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d
919 (4th Cir. 1974).
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records as the sole legitimate index of teaching competence. 8 Though
the Walston court may have provided a helpful standard of review for
future testing cases, whether brought under Title VII or the fourteenth
amendment, it does little to relieve the dilemma facing school boards in
choosing satisfactory criteria for teacher selection. This task remains for
future courts.
Catherine Meier Walsh
58. One commentator criticizes this trend:
The development of such a trend will be unfortunate not only because it is likely to
result in the nation's classrooms being conducted by academically qualified people,
many of whom may simply not be good teachers. It will be unfortunate because it
will represent the presupposition on the part of the courts of the very issue being
challenged.. : which is by no means self-evident: that an academic degreeis a valid
determinant of teaching ability. As well respected as they are in this country, degrees
should not be permitted to escape the scrutiny of stringent equal protection and
Title VII standards when used as a sine qua non for employment. Where the
requirement of an academic degree establishes a racial classification, it should be
"demonstrably a measure of job performance," and its correlation with teaching
ability should be shown to be as great as that for permissible standardized tests.
22 BUFFALo L. REv. 655, 675 (1973). See also note 54 supra.
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